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Towards a Grand Unified Theory of International Economic Law 
 
David Collins∗ 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This article presents chaos, a theory drawn from the physical sciences, as an explanatory model 
for international economic law which for the purposes of this study will be taken to consist of 
the law of the WTO, international investment law, and the policies of the IMF and World Bank. 
The rules promulgated by these institutions as the central pillars of global economic governance 
are both indeterminate and susceptible to external influences, leading to unpredictable 
outcomes in the longer term, even if they appear deterministic on the small scale as applied to 
individual states or firms in particular instances. This article will attempt to illustrate that the 
observed chaotic nature of international economic law should be viewed as a benevolent feature 
of the system, as its inescapable unpredictability engenders flexibility and adaptability. These 
are traits which are valuable for both governments and firms seeking to prosper within the 
dynamic global economy. The utility of international economic law should therefore not be 
judged by reference to macroeconomic benchmarks or by its capacity to achieve predictable 
outcomes. The article concludes by suggesting that the shared, advantageous characteristic of 
chaos may be seen as means of conceptually unifying the four disciplines of international 
economic law. 
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1.  Introduction:  International Economic Law and Chaos Theory  
This article applies a theory drawn from the physical sciences as a descriptive and explanatory 
model of international economic law. Chaos theory captures the essence of international 
economic law’s complex unpredictability, reflected in the regime’s reliance on highly 
indeterminate rules which are manifest in part by its lack of measurable impact on its domains 
of influence in the global economy.  The article will attempt to argue that the disordered and 
unforeseeable nature of international economic law should not be construed as weaknesses.  
Indeed, as a chaotic system, international economic law cultivates several advantages that are 
inimical to legal certainty and predictability, which are sometimes conflated with legitimacy in 
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legal systems.1 These benefits include stimulating the long term adaptability and innovative 
capacity of firms and strengthening non-economic ties between nations. 
The application of an explanatory theory from a wholly non-legal discipline responds 
to the growing body of academic literature which seeks to define the contours of international 
economic law, a pursuit which appears to be motivated by the need to refine ways of 
conceptualizing this body of law in a more holistic manner.  While there remains much debate 
among scholars as to its precise content2, international economic law is often described as a 
sphere of public international law (the law governing relations between states) as it applies to 
economic activities.  Traditionally this includes the law of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO); international investment agreements (IIA)s including dispute settlement through 
investment treaty arbitration; international monetary law focusing primarily on the domain of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and finally international development law, 
concentrating on the role of the World Bank.3  The so-called ‘three pillars’ of multilateral 
global economic governance may therefore be thought of as the Bretton Woods institutions of 
the WTO (as descended from the GATT), the IMF, the World Bank.4  While it is without 
question that many aspects of international economic law exist apart from the established 
processes of these four organizations, notably customary international law and regional trade 
agreements, this article will adopt an institution-based approach5 to focus on these four loci of 
rule-making power and authority. International economic law as promulgated by the work of 
these organizations aims to empower market forces through the elimination of excessive 
regulatory barriers to the flows of trade and capital while providing mechanisms for the 
inclusion of participants that would be otherwise unable to benefit from enhanced international 
commercial activity because of their developmental status. The institutions of economic 
governance have distinct responsibilities but share overlapping functions in their aim to 
cooperate through working relationships in order to effectuate their oversight of the global 
economy.   
As the descriptive and analytical framework of this article, chaos theory originates from 
the fields of mathematics and physics but has been applied to a number of disciplines including 
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engineering and biology.  Heralded as one of the three great scientific theories of the 20th 
century6, a variant of chaos theory has been applied to social systems and has been used to 
explain issues such as criminality and poverty. There is an emerging scholarship that has 
applied chaos theory to public international law, including the law of the WTO7 and 
international investment law.8  Simply put, chaos theory postulates that complex systems 
exhibit features of order on the small scale – meaning that there are discernible, deterministic 
patterns – but on the macro level these lead to unforeseeable outcomes as a consequence of the 
latent randomness found in all complex systems.  Highly sensitive to initial conditions, chaotic 
systems are necessarily disordered even if they do not superficially appear so, meaning in the 
longer term meaningful prediction is impossible.9   
This article proposes that international economic law’s status as a chaotic system 
explains its observed effects (or lack thereof) on the global economy.  International economic 
law is deterministic in that it is based on pre-established set of rules, namely the laws contained 
variously in treaties and articles of agreement as supplemented by the principles of customary 
international law. Thus if there were no random elements in the process by which these law 
were applied, in theory outcomes could be determined in advance with absolute certainty. Yet 
because of the global economy’s complexity and intrinsic randomness reflected for example in 
market and political fluctuations, combined with the indeterminacy of the law’s principles as 
applied to varying factual contexts, the macro effects of international economic law are 
inevitably unforeseeable, particularly in the long-term.  This article will expand upon the 
modelling of international economic law as a chaotic system by further suggesting that the 
chaotic nature of this system can and does generate positive outcomes.  Accordingly, in 
addition to being illusory, legal certainty and with it the predictability of legal consequences 
has been unjustly idolized as signifying the legitimacy and effectiveness of a legal regime. 
While many if not all systems of law may exhibit some chaotic tendencies, it will be argued 
that this nature is particularly radical within and crucial to international economic law.  The 
concept of predictability which is at the heart of this critique is both that which is associated 
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with how the law is applied to specific cases, as well as more generally with respect to law as 
a matter of policy in terms of its capacity to produce intended results. 
Before embarking on the exploration of this model, it is necessary to raise the objection 
that the application of a method of analysis drawn from the physical sciences may be unsuitable 
for a legal setting. Predicated on social interactions, law is not a science10 and therefore cannot 
not be subject to empirical examination with the expectation that outcomes will repeat with 
regularity.  Clearly law is not conducive to the exclusion of quantifiable variables through 
repeated experimentation in order to test theories, even if judicial decisions and treaties 
superficially share some of these features.  International economic law, as all spheres of law, 
is highly complex and imperfectly determinate relative to the systems studied in the physical 
sciences and mathematics.  It is infused with human discretion and predicated upon changing 
facts and circumstances, all of which make genuine testable repetition in the scientific sense 
impossible.11 As such, international economic laws’ indeterminacy and sensitivity to external 
factors, and by extension its predictability is a question of degree.  
This article will proceed as follows.  The first two parts will demonstrate that 
international economic law’s central pillars of governance and rule-making have demonstrated 
both indeterminacy in their foundational principles and marginality their effects on the global 
economy, features which can be explained by the regime’s conformity with chaos theory.  In 
other words, the WTO, international investment treaties, the IMF and the World Bank have 
achieved little in the way of promoting economic growth, and to the extent that they have, their 
effect is uneven and unpredictable, but this may be viewed as a feature endemic to complex, 
rules-based systems.  The final part of this article suggests that the observed chaotic nature of 
international economic law should not necessarily be viewed with trepidation.  Rather, 
international economic law’s influences on the dynamic processes of globalization foster 
resilience and adaptation which is conducive to prosperity and growth over time.   
 
 
2.  Chaotic System: International Economic Law’s Disorganized Rules 
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As will be shown in this section, the chaotic nature of international economic law is evident in 
the high degree of indeterminacy in many of its key principles, compromising the system’s 
certainty and functionality as an instrument of predictability.  The wide ranging nature of this 
analysis across a range of sub-disciplines necessitates a highly general approach in which 
concepts will be considered in brief rather than subject to comprehensive evaluation.  It should 
be emphasized here that the purpose of this article is not to offer a substantive critique of the 
features of any of these legal regimes but rather to develop a theory by reference to broadly 
observable trends.  In that sense it can be seen as a starting point for further discussion. 
 
i) The Law of the WTO 
As one of the major pillars of international economic governance, the WTO is an international 
organization now composed of 160 member states.  Its aim is to liberalize trade in goods and 
services in order to stimulate economic growth.  Created in 1995 but existing as a stand-alone 
treaty (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) since 1947, the WTO’s primary method 
of achieving this goal is through the reduction of tariffs and the prevention of various forms of 
nationality-based discrimination, although more recently it has turned its attention to issues 
such as anti-dumping and technical barriers to trade.  As an institution, the WTO is both a 
forum for the negotiation of further international trade liberalization as well as a mechanism 
for settling disputes between its members regarding the implementation of its many 
agreements. 
The laws which comprise the various agreements of the WTO exhibit a lack of clarity 
which makes the assessment of their impact on future global trade flows problematic, much as 
pre-estimating their impact on parties to particular disputes can be difficult.  A few examples 
of such concepts will be outlined briefly as indications of the randomness that characterizes 
much of WTO law – again, this article is not meant to offer a comprehensive critique of the 
contested features of the regime’s rules.  First, the concept of ‘likeness’ that is necessary to 
establish discrimination on the basis of national origin of a good as dictated by the national 
treatment standard of the GATT is so variable that it was famously described as an ‘accordion’ 
by the Appellate Body because of its capacity to morph depending on factual circumstances.12 
While there may be some objective criteria by which ‘likeness’ can be assessed, such as 
physical characteristics of products, the enigmatic nature of the test means that governments 
have little room beforehand to appreciate whether their regulatory initiatives will transgress 
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WTO rules and therefore be susceptible to challenge through the system’s dispute settlement 
procedure.  For their part, traders are unsure as to whether any regulatory discrimination they 
may suffer is actionable because they will not know if differential treatment is justifiable based 
on often unknowable features of a particular market at a given time.   
Similar vagaries exist in relation to the WTO’s general exceptions, found in GATT 
Article XX and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article IV which 
authorize the departure from the agreements’ core obligations, including non-discrimination.  
While the relevant public policy grounds that entitle a WTO Member to breach the GATT or 
GATS are listed in a highly discernable manner, the enumerated grounds are qualified by 
uneven connecting language (the ambiguous ‘relating to’ or ‘necessary for’) as well as by the 
so-called ‘chapeau’ which asks whether the specific measure is a disguised restriction on 
international trade – effectively meaning that it was enacted for a protectionist purpose.   
Such language compels a value-leaden balancing exercise which epitomizes the random 
nature of judicial decision-making at the WTO wherein panels and the Appellate Body must 
surmise not only the policy goal behind the relevant measure but also the manner in which it is 
enacted in the context of the specific national jurisdiction.  The lack of predictability in how 
the law is applied through the WTO dispute settlement process is an unavoidable erratic given 
the opacity of regulators’ genuine purpose, which is itself often redolent with political 
undertones.  It also departs from the WTO’s stated objective of consistency, even within a 
system that lacks stare decisis. The inherent unreliability of the assessment of the general 
exceptions, for example, has resulted in severe judicial risk aversion - WTO Members have 
been successful in using a general exception to defend a measure only once.13 The 
systematization of the standing Appellate Body procedure, which hears appeals on points of 
law from the ad hoc panels, has undoubtedly contributed some jurisprudential coherence to the 
interpretation of WTO law.  However WTO panellists and Appellate Body members tend to be 
former government officials, not lawyers, hinting at an overall objective of pragmatism in the 
resolution of disputes rather than predictable adherence to rules.14  
The provisions covering ‘safeguards’ are among the most obscure features of the 
WTO’s legal framework.  Safeguard measures are one of the WTO’s key economic emergency 
exceptions, allowing Members to impose trade barriers when an import surge causes or 
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threatens to cause ‘serious injury to the domestic industry.’15 As a consequence of their 
interference with normal trade relations between WTO members, their use requires a sudden, 
unforeseen increase in imported goods.  The existence of such a situation will be determined 
by WTO panels, again, on the capricious case-by-case basis.16  While there may be some 
certainty in the quantification of imports necessary to demonstrate an increase, suddenness and 
unforeseeability remain essentially qualitative judgements that defy functional pre-assessment.  
The Appellate Body’s refinement of ‘serious injury’ to denote a very high standard of economic 
harm17 has done little to resolve the mutability of the test.  More specifically, the causal 
connection between increased imports and injury to competing industries cannot ever be 
intelligibly demonstrated to the exclusion of other factors, requiring a significant inferential 
leap on the part of WTO adjudicators when considering the legitimacy of a safeguard 
measure.18 Isolating what factors have caused harm to an industry is fraught with assumption 
and guesswork, doing so with respect to injuries that have not yet occurred is virtually 
impossible to perform with any degree of predictive accuracy. 
 In a similar fashion, the WTO’s approach to anti-dumping has attracted criticism for 
the high degree of interpretive latitude it accords to national governments, allowing Member 
states to impose these duties at their own behest on the basis of often parochial assessments.  
While conserving the integrity of WTO’s global governance by deferring to each member’s 
construction of its own methodology for evaluating and responding to dumping, this de-
centralized approach has been accused of conveying too much autonomy to Member states.  
The alleged result is a confusing environment for exporters around the world seeking to set 
competitive prices for their goods in foreign markets without fear of reprisal.  For example, the 
EU’s aggressive anti-dumping actions against China have been condemned as largely 
politically motivated attacks linked to poor domestic competitiveness.19 With these many 
issues in mind, it is difficult to see how the direction and magnitude of future trade flows can 
be anticipated with any degree of certainty. 
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ii) International Investment Law and Investor-State Arbitration 
The core substantive standards of international investment law, developed gradually from a 
variety of sources including treaty and custom and which incorporates concepts from fields as 
diverse as commercial law, human rights, and diplomatic protection have resulted in an 
inchoate discipline that defies reliable formulaic application. International investment law 
consists of a network several thousand bilateral and regional investment treaties, collectively 
known as international investment agreements (IIAs).  While these are not created or 
supervised by one multilateral institution, there is broad uniformity within the network of IIAs, 
most of which include most favoured nation clauses allowing terms to be imported from one 
bilateral regime into many others.  As such there is a kind of de facto multilateralism within 
international investment law.20 IIAs tend to contain similar provisions, protecting already 
established investments from excessive interference by host states.  International investment 
law also encompasses investor-state arbitration, conducted through a wide range of ad hoc 
tribunals as well as through institutions like the World Bank’s widely used International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  The framework of international investment 
law as an instrument by which investors’ activities are protected from undue interference by 
host states is believed to increase the level of foreign direct investment (FDI), a stated purpose 
in the preamble to many IIAs.21 
As with international trade law through the WTO, many of the key legal principles 
contained in IIAs are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, diminishing their predictive 
utility for foreign investors and host countries alike.  The indeterminate legal framework is 
magnified in investment law because the specific language used changes from treaty to treaty, 
much as the factual context in which the law is applied is itself variable. The attempt to derive 
a coherent jurisprudence constante from the body of treaties, customary international law and 
investment arbitration caselaw has accordingly become somewhat of a frustrating activity for 
academics and practitioners.  With the recognition that it is difficult to make generalizations 
about the law governing foreign direct investment in mind, a few examples of the regime’s 
unsettled legal principles will be noted briefly. 
 Perhaps the most notoriously ambiguous concept within international investment law 
is the standard of Fair and Equitable Treatment (‘FET’) which appears in almost all IIAs. The 
most widely claimed standard in investor-treaty arbitration, FET is rightly described as a catch-
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all provision because it fills in the gaps not covered by more precise standards such as national 
treatment (which itself is subject to the inherent indeterminacy of the ‘likeness’ question 
discussed above).22 Rooted in the already fluid language of ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’, there is still 
no settled definition of FET, a factor which may explain its popularity among strategic 
claimants.  As a consequence of its extreme variability, FET can be used to object to a wide 
range of governmental behaviour.  
 Another major obscurity in international investment law is the definition of 
expropriation, or more specifically measures that are ‘tantamount to expropriation’ as enacted 
by host states against foreign investors’ assets.  Precisely what type of regulatory action is 
captured by this phrase is widely debated among scholars23 and regularly deliberated by 
investment tribunals24 as a consequence of the guarantee against expropriation without 
compensation found in most IIAs. The understanding of this concept is further muddled by the 
expansive understanding of ‘creeping expropriation’ in which a series of smaller regulatory 
burdens imposed by governments, when aggregated, may entitle the investor to compensation 
for their lost assets.25  Additionally, the vast extent to which host states may potentially escape 
liability under these provisions by reference to various public policy justifications in IIAs is 
bewildering.  Not only is there a tendency of IIAs not to include reference to a designated list 
of public policy objectives, even where various issues are specifically contemplated for by 
treaty there is no settled body of jurisprudence from which to derive clear tests by which to 
apply these measures in a uniform manner.26 
Much like the laws which it applies, the process of international investment arbitration 
is highly discretionary and unpredictable.  While domestic the dispute settlement system of the 
WTO is susceptible to randomness because of the inescapable foibles of human judgment 
among its largely diplomatically-trained judiciary, this peculiarity of adjudication is further 
aggravated in the context of investor-state arbitration because there is no consistency with 
respect to the identity of the arbitrators, as they are selected on an ad hoc basis for each dispute. 
Although there are a number of recognized experts in the field of investor-state arbitration who 
regularly appear as arbitrators, there remains a high degree of chance in the composition of an 
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arbitral tribunal.  ICSID’s annulment procedure is particularly problematic in this regard where 
arbitrators are initially chosen by the ICSID Chairman, seemingly at random.27  The narrow 
grounds of annulment under ICSID have not always been followed faithfully, leading to further 
incoherence with regards to the power of annulment committees to alter the outcome of 
previous awards.28 While the WTO’s Appellate Body fosters at least the perception of 
coherence to the process of dispute settlement, there is no such mechanism for arbitration 
decisions, leaving the overall system highly fragmented. 
One of the most notable inconstancies in investor-state dispute settlement is the lack of 
clarity with respect to its applicability to particular IIAs, depending on the effect of most 
favoured nation guarantees on procedural issues.29 A similar debate exists in relation to 
umbrella clauses, provisions found in many IIAs which entitle investors to use investment 
arbitration for any type of breach committed by a host state, including those which may be 
more properly the sphere of private contract law.30  The appropriate standard of review by an 
arbitration tribunal for a state’s assessment of their own treaty obligations remains uncertain 
and fragmented, causing commentators to call for a more unified approach.31  Lastly and 
perhaps most perniciously, tribunals regularly debate the appropriate way to measure the value 
of an asset that has been the subject of an unlawful interference by the host state.  This is a 
subject of particular discord because it not only represents a disagreement within the 
community of arbitrators as legal experts within the field of international investment law, it 
exposes divisions within arbitrators’ use of evidence even where the facts themselves are 
settled.  Asset evaluation is effectively a second layer of interpretation added to the complexity 
of the adjudicative process, further destabilizing the functional predictability of the exercise as 
way of understanding investors’ decisions on where and when to internationalize.  
  
 
iii) The Law and Policy of the International Monetary Fund 
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The International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) was created in the aftermath of World War II to 
ensure stability in the international monetary system and today has a membership of 188 
countries worldwide. The IMF’s objective is to extend short term loans, better known as the 
infamous ‘bailouts’ to countries experiencing balance of payment deficits triggered by national 
fiscal irresponsibility.  The organization’s rules are contained in its Articles of Agreement32, 
which also outline the IMF’s purpose and conditions of membership, which focuses on the 
requirement of member states to maintain an orderly system of currency exchange.33 This rule, 
coupled with the requirement to make currencies freely tradable34 allows money to move across 
jurisdictions in order to facilitate commerce and ultimately stimulate economic growth.  The 
organization itself has notoriously opaque governance, with very little guidance on precisely 
how decisions are made by bodies such as the Board of Governors and the Executive Board, 
especially in relation to the extension of sovereign loans to cope with sovereign debt crises.35 
This stifles the ability of governments as well as firms to pre-assess the organization’s impact 
on both the national as well as the global economy.   
There are several poorly defined concepts that can be found in the operational policies 
of the IMF, leading to much interpretive confusion and practical difficulties in terms of the 
organization’s long term effects. A good example of the imprecision of the IMF’s policies are 
the rules covering the use of its general resources, essentially governing to the conditions under 
which a member country may be extended a loan.  These refer to the need to ensure that there 
are adequate ‘safeguards’ in place.36 This rule implies that a member’s eligibility for an IMF 
loan should be in part based on its capacity for repayment.  Loans should therefore be 
contingent on the country’s economic viability.  However, IMF loan decisions do not appear 
to be based upon this criterion.  The countries that are chosen to receive IMF loans tend not to 
be selected on the basis of the economic health of the member state but rather on their political 
and economic linkages to the US and Europe (the main vote-holders in the organization), as 
well as the country’s own quota within the organization, essentially reflecting its geo-political 
power.37 In this sense, the IMF’s actions are strongly influenced by factors other than its own 
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laws, the vagueness of which facilitate debt more closely tied to the caprices of international 
politics. 
Perhaps the most prominent of the IMF’s ambiguous rules is the requirement that states 
maintain ‘orderly’ exchange rates, without an explanation as to precisely what this means, other 
than a prohibition on competitive currency devaluation.38  The use of the word ‘manipulate’ 
(members shall not manipulate exchange rates for competitive advantage) is confusing because 
it is not clear what type of action constitutes manipulation or how this could be proved.  Even 
if this concept were more certain, as a consequence of the organization’s heavily politicized 
decision-making, it would be difficult for the IMF to dictate that a member state employed a 
monetary policy in a manner that was intended to damage the economic position of another 
country.  It is therefore unsurprising that many countries have chosen to keep their currencies 
artificially low by quantitative easing or other means, allowing their manufactured goods to 
become less expensive on world markets.39 Global currency wars have ensued as a 
consequence of the IMF’s hesitancy to enforce its own tentative disapproval of currency 
devaluation.  Thus it makes little sense to consider the policies of the IMF in order to get a 
sense of future trends in either currency exchange or in assessing the likelihood that certain 
states will receive IMF loans. 
  
 
iv)  International Development: The World Bank  
The World Bank is an international organization that seeks to alleviate poverty in developing 
countries by stimulating foreign trade and investment through the provision of low interest 
loans primarily for infrastructure projects. Established in 1944 along with the IMF, the World 
Bank’s membership is identical to that of the IMF, with each of its 188 members bound by the 
organization’s Articles of Agreement.  Rules are also in place for the World Bank’s component 
organizations, including ICSID, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Taken together these materials comprise what 
could be described as the developmental component of international economic law.40  
 As with its sister organization the IMF, the most glaring obscurity in the World Bank’s 
rules, found in its Articles of Agreement, are those relating to the terms governing the extension 
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of its loans. These state that the Bank shall pay due regard to the prospects that the borrower 
will be in a position to meet its obligations under the loan and that the bank shall act ‘prudently’ 
without outlining what this entails.41 Disregarding that these instructions are ambiguous and as 
such afford wide latitude for bank decision-makers to impose their own discretion, there is little 
evidence that this rule is followed in practice.  As with the IMF, geopolitical influence appears 
to be one of the strongest determinants in whether or not a country enjoys loan support from 
the World Bank, not economic suitability or the capacity to repay loans, as indicated by the 
organization’s rules.  Instead, political allegiances strongly influenced the number of World 
Bank-funded projects that a given country received, even after accounting for domestic 
economic factors.42   
 Like the IMF, the World Bank’s internal operational procedures in terms of its decision-
making lack transparency. The disorganized current management of the World Bank has been 
accused of instituting unnecessary re-structuring, instigating excessive budget cuts and 
engaging in wasteful expenditures on initiatives such as external consultants.43  Commentators 
have observed that the functional capacity of the organization’s various organs of government, 
including its Board of Directors and Executive Directors and Advisory Council is not 
systematic.44  This makes pragmatic criticism, let alone anticipation of outcomes of World 
Bank funded projects challenging if not impossible.  
 To conclude this section, it has been suggested that the main institutions of international 
economic law operate on the basis of highly ambiguous rules.  Rather than providing and 
enforcing clear, authoritative direction, the WTO, international investment law, the IMF and 
the World Bank seem to be steered by the frailties of political economy.  The ‘case-by-case’ 
form of adjudication, while offering flexibility to the relevant parties at that time, further 
compromises the long term predictability of international economic law, resulting in a general 
sense of disorder with regards to the ultimate effects that result from the application of legal 
principles in practice 
 
 
3.  Chaotic Results: International Economic Law’s Sensitivity to Initial Conditions 
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Chaos theory states that complex systems are sensitive to initial conditions. These conditions 
are often imperceptible at the outset, making prediction of ultimate outcomes practically 
impossible and indeed creating a sense of overall randomness.45  In international economic law 
this is suggested to mean that the circumstances in which laws are developed and applied play 
a greater role in global economic relations than the operations of the laws themselves. These 
conditions include factors such as pre-existing levels of economic development, political and 
lobbying culture within each country, democratic variables such as the independence of courts 
and even cultural biases.  True to their shared nature as chaotic systems, there are strong 
indications that the four regimes of international economic law have had a marginal impact on 
the relevant measurable macro level features of the global economy. This assertion will be 
justified through the consideration of the views of some experts which have challenged the 
effectiveness of the WTO, IIAs and investor-state arbitration, the IMF and the World Bank. To 
be clear, the suggestion that the laws of these institutions have played an uncertain role in the 
achievement of their stated goals is not causally linked to the inherent indeterminacy of these 
laws as discussed above. Sensitivity to initial conditions is a separate characteristic of the 
discipline of international economic law that independently exposes its chaotic nature. 
 
i) International Trade: The World Trade Organization  
The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO states that one of the objectives of the 
organization is to expand ‘the production of and trade in goods and services.’46 While the total 
volume of world trade has increased since the creation of the WTO more than 20 years ago47, 
the role played by the WTO in increasing the level of world trade is far from established.  
Indeed, some authors suggest that the impact of the WTO on international trade has been 
minimal if not negative.  One well-known study concluded that countries belonging to the 
GATT/WTO do not have significantly different levels of trade from non-members,48 
suggesting that membership in the international trading community of the WTO is largely 
irrelevant, at least from a trade-impact perspective.  Of course, given that one purpose of the 
WTO be the prevention of rising protectionism, one might not expect there to be international 
trade increases as long as there are no decreases – representing the preservation of the status 
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quo.  However, other studies have demonstrated that while WTO membership may have a 
positive effect on trade, this effect is uneven. Large industrialized nations have enjoyed 
increases in trade upon joining the WTO, whereas developing countries have in many cases 
seen their levels of trade decline.49 Indeed it appears as though global inequality has actually 
increased during the era of the GATT/WTO trade liberalization.50  This is problematic given 
the WTO’s stated mission to make ‘positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in 
international trade.’51  In its 2014 Trade and Development Report, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development urged that free trade does not lead to growth, advising 
that developing countries should avoid multilateral as well as bilateral trade agreements, 
focusing instead on domestic policies that stimulate demand.52  
It would seem as though the WTO has not prevented the escalation of trade 
protectionism, especially in recent years and in its more latent forms, such as subsidies and 
preferential government procurement policies.  The organization Global Trade Alert reports 
that more than 2500 protectionist measures have been enacted globally since the financial crisis 
of 2008.53  Even if it is plausible that this situation would have been worse without the 
multilateral efforts of the WTO, trade protectionism is thought to be responsible for only 20 
per cent of the observed decline in worldwide trade flows.54 The much more important 
contributors to the decline of global trade have little to do with international law or the 
regulatory oversight of the WTO.  Rather this trend can be ascribed to greater competitive 
parity between nations (for example the rising wages in China’s manufacturing sector) and the 
more general economic slowdown in emerging markets.55 Initial or extraneous conditions, 
namely the economic development of trading partners, dictate the global trading system’s 
outcomes more so than the rules of international economic law. 
It is often asserted that international economic organizations such as the WTO should 
be acknowledged for their role in radically reducing the extent of poverty in the developing 
world since the 1990s.  But more recently some experts have argued that the definition of 
extreme poverty used to assess policy impacts has been manipulated to yield artificial results.  
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The Asian Development Bank observed recently that the figure of US $1.25 per day, the level 
of daily income below which is considered extreme poverty, is too low and needs to be 
readjusted.  This means that many millions more people live in poverty than is actually 
appreciated.56 Rather than eradicating extreme poverty by eliminating barriers to international 
trade, the achievements for which the WTO often takes credit may actually reflect carefully 
constructed data. 
 Lastly, the marginality of the WTO as an instrument of international trade is evident in 
its weak enforcement mechanism, making rulings of its dispute settlement bodies often 
operatively useless.  Under the WTO rules, if a Member fails to comply with a final ruling in 
a dispute, the winning party may retaliate by suspending trade concessions in favour offending 
member.57  But the retaliation remedy is too feeble to be effective, particularly in disputes 
between countries of asymmetrical size.  If a small country suspends concessions against 
another larger country, it is more likely to harm its own economy than that of the offending 
state.  Suspending trade concessions in this manner can also be injurious to firms that whose 
products will be subjected to higher tariffs.58 Moreover, approximately one third of WTO 
disputes to date have resulted in non-compliance to some degree.59 This may itself be the result 
of the WTO’s lack of a genuine enforcement mechanism, relying as it does on reputational 
sanction, the effect of which is difficult to monitor because of fluctuations in international 
relations.60  
 
ii) Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement 
Commentators have described international investment law as a complex system which is 
highly sensitive to initial conditions in that evolves as it adapts to de-stabilizing events which 
may be either major or minor in nature.61 International investment law’s sensitivity to initial 
conditions is seen in data on the effectiveness of of IIAs in increasing FDI flows between 
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signatory states.  A wide range of studies isolating the role of IIAs has revealed varied 
responses to this vital question.62 Shockingly for some, a number of studies have observed no 
positive correlation on IIA signage and FDI flows whatsoever,63 a troubling indictment of the 
utility of international investment law.  Others revealed that to the extent that IIAs do encourage 
inward FDI, this tends to occur only when the host state already has a stable business 
environment and reasonably strong domestic institutions.64  This suggests that it is extraneous 
factors which actually influence firms’ decisions to internationalize, such as natural resource 
endowments and the cost of other inputs such as labour, and not the presence of an IIA.  
 The quality of political relations between the home and host state, not IIAs, appears to 
be the most important determinant for FDI inflows.65  With diplomatic pressures acting as a 
crucial factor in the locational decision of a multinational enterprise, the patterns of FDI remain 
subject to the permutations of domestic economies and international relations, rather than the 
theoretically stable legal framework of international economic law.  The risk of excessive 
intervention by host states with the economic affairs of foreign investors is therefore best 
viewed as idiosyncratic rather than systematic or controllable through legal sanction.  Host 
states will choose to interfere with foreign investors based not on the absence of an IIA with 
strong investor protections, but as a consequence of the quality of relations with the home 
country.  
To the extent that IIAs do offer investors some comfort against excessive governmental 
interference by host states, this is also susceptible to the vagaries of domestic law – the initial 
conditions that act in concert with investment law at the international level.  This situation is 
captured not only by the fact that states can tailor their consent to arbitration, excluding types 
of disputes that they consider to be too sensitive or requiring the prior exhaustion of local 
remedies – is also well-demonstrated by the imperfect enforceability of investor-state 
arbitration for which consent was validly granted.  Under ad hoc arbitration systems, other 
treaty based enforcement mechanisms such as the New York Convention are required for 
awards to be fully enforceable by domestic courts.  Yet there is still the possibility that an 
arbitration award will be nullified if there were procedural irregularities as determined by 
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domestic tribunals.  Furthermore, under ICSID awards issued by international arbitration 
tribunals are self-enforcing, meaning that the winning party does not have to pursue separate 
legal action in domestic courts in order to compel the loser to comply.66  But the presumption 
that ICSID awards will always be automatically enforced in all jurisdictions is not always 
accurate. A number of countries, among them China, still insist upon separate authorization by 
a domestic court in order to guarantee enforcement of foreign arbitral awards – including those 
of ICSID.67  Thus resolution even through the World Bank’s ICSID must not be regarded as 
an absolute certainty.  
Even in the absence of the need to seek separate enforcement procedures in some 
jurisdictions, there is nothing that investor-state arbitration alone can do to compel a losing 
party to pay should it refuse to do so.  While generally compliance with ICSID awards has been 
good68, the reality of non-enforcement has been exposed in relation to a series of awards levied 
against Argentina as a result of measures it took during its financial crisis.69  Argentina has yet 
to pay any of these amounts owed to aggrieved investors.  Likewise, Russia appears to be 
resisting an arbitral tribunal’s order to pay billions of dollars in damages to the shareholders of 
Yukos for its unlawful interference with that company’s operations.70  It may well be that none 
of these awards will ever be paid.  The World Bank has indicated that where a member country 
fails to comply with the award of an ICSID tribunal it may be denied access to further loans,71 
but this kind of pressure (which has never been used) is ineffectual in situations where the 
country cannot rather than will not pay. It also has limited relevance to non-complying 
developed countries that are unlikely to seek the World Bank’s assistance.  Lastly of course, 
investors themselves cannot have claims brought against them by host states unless they have 
given specific consent for such actions in a contract, a situation which renders the notion of 
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effective dispute settlement under international investment law at best imbalanced and at worst 
illusory. 
  
 
iii) Sovereign Debt Relief and Monetary Relations: The International Monetary Fund 
As suggested in relation to the WTO and IIAs, the IMF has evidently played a negligible role 
in the global economy. It too is susceptible to the initial conditions that interact with the 
application of its laws. Several commentators, including the former Chief Economist of the 
World Bank, argue that the IMF failed to help a many of the countries to which it extended 
loans, in part due to its inability to tailor its policies to suit individual country circumstances.72  
Drawing evidence from a number of countries throughout the world, economists have 
demonstrated that IMF loan programs do not stimulate growth and in some cases actually 
reduce economic viability in the participant country.73  Moreover, to the extent that the IMF 
aims to complement the efforts of IIAs in improving the conditions for firm 
internationalization, IMF loans have marginal effects on the level of inward foreign 
investment.74  
The IMF has been ineffectual in responding to currency manipulation tactics pursued 
by a number of countries in modern times, including China and the US.75 This has relegated 
what was intended to be some form of multilateral monetary policy to the hands of national 
regulators, such as the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of China, even where these decisions 
have global implications. Again, re-existing economic and political conditions within these 
countries, including unanticipated economic shocks, play a greater role in the world economy 
than international economic law.  
As with the WTO and international investment law, the IMF suffers from weak 
enforcement, stifling its objectives.  In order to impose its rules on its constituent members, the 
IMF may rely on its powers of surveillance, which consists of evaluating economic data and 
preparing annual reports on a member’s economic status and financial stability.76 Clearly the 
surveillance program has not succeeded in ensuring that IMF members fulfil their obligations.77 
This is because, as noted above, the organization is effectively controlled by the strongest 
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nations, especially the US which has the capacity to block any reports that disclose negative 
information.  The US’ sway over the IMF is not simply a symbolic affront to the major 
emerging markets – political intransigence in the US Congress recently prevented the 
authorization of a major increase in the IMF’s capitalization, further diminishing the 
organization’s capacity to fulfil its mandate.  Rather than embodying the rules of universal 
application as would connote an orderly system, the IMF’s capacity to institute meaningful 
change are largely dictated by geopolitical influence.   
 
   
iv)  International Development: The World Bank  
Like the WTO and the IMF, the laws of the World Bank have had an inconsequential impact 
on the global economy. This is in large part the consequence of the greater role played by 
extraneous factors, such as political allegiances and domestic institutional conditions. One of 
the World Bank’s main attempted contributions to development has been through its efforts to 
increase FDI to high-risk countries by offsetting some of the dangers associated with political 
upheavals and unstable governments. Created in 1988, the World Bank’s MIGA offers political 
risk insurance (PRI) to eligible investment projects undertaken in the developing world.  But 
PRI remains poorly used by firms.78  It is true that FDI inflows into developing countries tend 
to be somewhat more heavily backed by PRI schemes such as those of MIGA, but at only 30 
per cent uptake, PRI is accurately described as boutique financial product.79 Similarly, the 
World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) lends money directly to investors 
pursuing commercial projects in the developing world.  While it has financed a number of 
infrastructure-oriented works, this is far less than either private banks or national funding 
regimes like export credit agencies.80 Whether it is because the World Bank imposes onerous 
conditions on firms or because its services are poorly understood, it is clear that firms engaging 
in business in developing states are not making beneficial use of the Bank’s resources. 
More importantly, where developmental loans have been extended by the World Bank 
to fund infrastructure projects, these loans have not had a measurable impact on the beneficiary 
states.  Indeed, there has been widespread dissatisfaction regarding the outcome of World Bank 
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funded projects in the developing world for some time.  The IFC conceded that only half of its 
initiatives have succeeded in attaining the desired developmental goals, with the success rate 
of the Bank itself gauged at roughly 40 per cent.  These results have been variously ascribed to 
poor project design, inadequate management and weak coordination among participants.81 The 
application of the organization’s rules has resulted in uneven outcomes.  
Circumstances outside the bank’s control, such as the institutional capacity of target 
states, appear to exert a strong influence on the outcome of loan projects.  A recent study 
examined the effectiveness of several thousand World Bank sponsored projects over a period 
of almost 30 years, concluding that country-level characteristics had a significant impact on 
the success of the individual project.  These so-called macro level features, essentially 
institutional integrity at the national level rather than the management of the project by the 
Bank itself, are the clearest determinants of the outcomes of individual World Bank initiatives.  
Generally speaking intrinsically bad developmental projects undertaken in environments with 
weak institutional infrastructure cannot be saved through greater supervision and intervention 
at the international level by the Bank.82 In other words, World Bank funded projects tend to 
work best in countries where domestic governance is already strong.83  Loans extended by the 
World Bank in conjunction with assistance from the IMF performed no better, with no evidence 
of economic growth observed among many sample countries in conjunction with these 
programs.  The laws of the World Bank have had little impact upon the organization’s observed 
effects on the world’s developing countries. 
To conclude this section, measurable outcomes observed in international trade, foreign 
investment, monetary relations and development finance are exogenous relative to the 
institutions of international economic law. They cannot be explained by reference to the 
workings of these institutions as dictated by the laws through which they operate but are 
manifestations of initial conditions such as geopolitical relations, economic development and 
institutional factors at the national level, a clear iteration of chaos theory.   
 
 
4.  Benevolent Chaos:  The Unexpected Benefits of International Economic Law 
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Some systems are believed to improve due to stress or testing.84  Likewise, chaotic systems can 
foster adaptability, innovation and creativity. As these qualities are essential to successful firms 
and responsible governments, the indeterminacy and sensitivity to initial conditions evident in 
international economic law must not be reflexively cast in a negative light.  To the extent that 
the failure of the laws of the WTO, IIAs, the IMF and the World Bank to fulfil their stated 
mandates can be explained by their nature as a chaotic system, international economic law also 
appears to offer certain unintended beneficial outcomes.  This section will suggest how some 
of the chaotic features described above may be regarded as desirable. 
Before exploring this proposition of benevolent chaos it is essential to question the 
assumption that certainty and predictability within a legal system must be seen as virtues or as 
essential ingredients of legitimacy.  While often fetishized by legal theorists85, certainty and 
predictability remain subordinate to the needs and aspirations of the international community,86 
for whom these values may be immaterial or even antithetical.  In the context of the global 
economy, such other goals may be founded upon resilience in the face of change and the 
capacity for transformation. The narrow pursuit of a system’s capacity to produce static 
outcomes that can be anticipated by its participating actors at the expense of other needs may 
therefore be myopic and potentially harmful.  Furthermore, as noted above an excessive 
emphasis on the foreseeability of the results of judicial or legislative decision-making  presents 
an artificial understanding of the way legal institutions, like international courts, operate.  Such 
systems are highly dependent upon the factual context in which they operate, namely the nature 
of relationships between states and the natural dynamism of markets.  Some unexpected 
advantages offered by the four chief fields of international economic law as a consequence of 
their chaotic nature will now be considered.  
 
i) International Trade 
The uneven effects of the WTO on world trade coupled with the unpredictable consequences 
of its dispute settlement system do not diminish the WTO’s value to the global economy, even 
if there are no measurable increases in trade flows or in the GDP of its member states.  First, 
accession to the WTO has become a major symbolic exercise that has helped to bring cohesion 
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to the international community.  China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 has been among the 
most significant geopolitical event of the 21st Century, signifying China’s long-awaited 
engagement in world affairs and unlocking its potential for massive ‘soft law.’ Secondly, the 
WTO’s dispute settlement system may not provide the legal certainty desired by governments, 
but it does offer political advantages. In using the dispute settlement system, politicians are 
able to ‘save face’ by deferring to the requirements of the WTO’s exclusive jurisdiction in 
order to relinquish the pursuit of various domestic policies of interest to vocal groups through 
other fora.  The WTO dispute settlement system also de-politicizes trade disputes, preventing 
them from escalating tensions between states. 
 While many of its laws are highly ambiguous, the WTO regime’s built-in flexibility has 
allowed it to conserve member states’ keen regard for preserving their own sovereignty within 
an international organization. This capacity is seen notably in the individualized approach the 
WTO takes to the regulation of anti-dumping, allowing member states to craft their own 
procedures for investigating and imposing these duties.  From the perspective of firms, since 
anti-dumping duties can negate competitive advantages in labour in places like China, firms 
from these countries facing uncertain levies will need to seek other commercial strategies to 
survive.  It is believed that the pressures of unpredictable anti-dumping duties may inspire the 
development of Chinese brands or shift the emphasis towards higher value goods, which may 
be of interest to the domestic workforce.87  These types of innovations might not occur were 
the WTO’s oversight of anti-dumping duties more organized. 
The incoherence of WTO law and its unbalanced effects on the growth in world trade 
has realigned policy experts’ attention to the importance of domestic trade policies and away 
from international, or at least multilateral rule-making.  To an extent this is reflected in the 
impasse in Doha Round negotiations through the WTO.  Recognizing the lesser role of 
international and bilateral trade policy in economic growth, UNCTAD has recently suggested 
that world trade can only be stimulated by an increase in demand, which requires action at the 
national level. This contemplates not protectionism, but macroeconomic policies aimed at 
expanding domestic consumption and improving capacity of underperforming industries.88  In 
this sense, the failure of the WTO to make a measureable contribution to growth in international 
trade has called attention to the need for policy-makers to focus more on local matters, possibly 
such as taxes and wages, where the fruits of their labour may be more demonstrably felt.   
                                                 
87
 E Lastrade, ‘Market Protection in Europe and Anti-Dumping Law’ [2006] 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=9171187> 
88
 UNCTAD World Trade and Development Report 2014 at v 
24 
 
The WTO has shown the capacity to respond to its chaotic nature, not only reducing 
but actually exploiting these features for the betterment of its global constituents.  For example, 
it is understood that the unpredictability of legal outcomes can lead to distorted share valuations 
as markets attempt to price litigation risks.  The accuracy of such pricings rises in proportion 
to the certainty of the outcome as well as the availability of information. Thus, highly 
unpredictable outcomes (such as those of WTO disputes) should be expected to result in 
inaccurate or randomized market pricings, misleading investors and hindering the allocation of 
capital to productive uses.  Instances of this occurring in the early days of WTO dispute 
settlement were well-documented, especially in relation to unanticipated challenges.89 
However, cognizant of the unreliable outcomes of its dispute settlement process, the WTO has 
mitigated some of the harmful consequences of such inaccurate market pricings first by 
augmenting the availability of available information on pending disputes, mostly through its 
accessible website, and also emphasizing the capricious diplomatic as opposed to legally 
certain nature of these proceedings (i.e. mandatory consultations, decisions as 
recommendations rather than judgments).  This does not enhance the predictability of the 
system, rather it acknowledges its unpredictability.  Markets are accordingly drawn away from 
litigation risk to more dependable sources of information for pricing signals.  For their part, 
WTO member governments are able to bring claims secure in the knowledge that this will not 
result in harmful market fluctuations. 
  
 
ii) Foreign Direct Investment 
Commentators have praised international investment law for its evolutionary ‘trial and error’ 
development in response to the shifting needs of the global economy, as distinct from a more 
top-down regime that was designed for purpose.90 There is much merit to this claim, as there 
is little doubt that tailored IIAs along with investor-state arbitration remain popular.  While 
evidence supporting increased FDI flows as a consequence of IIA signage remains elusive, 
each year states continue to demonstrate their willingness to commit to these obligations, even 
where the existence of systemic political risks seems tenuous (as in the pending Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership between the US and the EU). This may be explained by the 
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fact that there are other benefits associated with these treaties, regardless and in some cases 
because of uncertainty of many of the core legal concepts.  Chief among these is their capacity 
for ‘signalling’ the openness of a country to foreign investors from around the world.  
Concluding an IIA sends a positive message to foreign investors from other countries, just as 
it makes a legal commitment to those investors from the party state.91 In this sense, IIAs act as 
a promotional initiative for countries. This can be magnified by the widespread media attention 
that is now devoted to many of these instruments.  Furthermore, even where there is no 
measureable increase in FDI whatsoever accompanying an IIA, concluding investment 
agreements is clearly a worthwhile diplomatic exercise.  The ceremony attached to the formal 
signing of these instruments by governmental representatives can help cement political ties, 
even where long term economic benefits are uncertain.  While highly indeterminate, the 
substantive standards of IIAs, developed organically from a variety of disparate sources over 
decades, commentators observe a tendency towards convergence rather than divergence in their 
meanings and application.92 By this it is meant that while the precise implication of a given 
standard remains uncertain, this uncertainty is becoming one that is increasingly shared within 
a community of investment arbitrators, policy-makers and scholars, allowing firms to have a 
reasonable idea of whether or not a given claim is worth pursuing based on the plausible 
validity of their legal entitlements.  Clearly uncertainty in the application of legal rules creates 
room for flexibility, but radical uncertainty has to the potential to so completely undercut the 
legal order that flexibility becomes meaningless.  International investment arbitration may well 
have achieved an effective medium ground between the two extremes. 
In addition to the gains associated with IIAs themselves, there are several potential 
advantages resulting from the chaotic nature of dispute settlement in international investment 
law. First, given the uncertainty associated with international arbitration as a means of 
resolving grievances in part due to the ambiguity of concepts like FET and indirect 
expropriation, host states may be compelled to overhaul their local laws to make them more 
appealing to firms, including their courts and administrative infrastructure even in the absence 
of an IIA which requires them to do so.93 Improving one’s rankings in the World Bank’s Doing 
Business reports has become a vital objective of some countries.94  In contrast to the dubious 
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track record of the international institutions that are the focus of this article, domestic 
institutions like democratic governments and independent courts have been remarkably 
successful in stimulating economic growth, in part because of their relative predictability.95 
Second, with the prospect of victory largely unknowable, one of the often unappreciated 
purposes of investment arbitration is to trigger settlement by the parties.96 The settlement-
generating potential of arbitration is revealed by ICSID’s caseload statistics in which 25 per 
cent of all awards rendered embodied a settlement agreement at the parties’ request.97 Many 
more settlements may occur in investor-state arbitration than are publicly reported.  Settlement 
is so vital because foreign investors have a long term relationship with the host states that needs 
to be preserved where possible and this can be put at risk by the imposition of an arbitral award.  
A settlement allows for compromise and conciliation, both of which are conducive to a lasting 
relationship between investor and host country. Thirdly, investor-state arbitration remains 
attractive to parties because of the degree of control and customization that exists, particularly 
in relation to the choice of law as well as the identity of the tribunal members. This results in 
some degree of predictability with respect to the outcome of the particular dispute at hand. For 
broad trends in IIA interpretation to be predictable, some manner of genuine precedent as well 
as consistent choice of domestic law (as it interplays with treaty law) would need to be present 
and it is likely that this would undermine much of the flexibility that investors seek. 
Furthermore, as noted above, even a final award in investment arbitration may fails to 
achieve full compensation for investors possibly because it may not be fully enforceable.  As 
with the WTO’s national approach to anti-dumping, paradoxically it is only because host states 
retain the capacity to deny the enforcement of arbitral awards that they are willing to participate 
in investor-state dispute settlement and IIAs ab initio.  This approach is mirrored in the 
selective nature of commitments made in each individual IIA – with some countries, such as 
Australia, indicating that it will no longer include investor-state dispute settlement in its IIAs 
but importantly not terminating its IIA programme altogether.98  For firms, the practical 
limitations on enforceability of arbitral awards force them to offset risks through 
diversification. Where the future of one project is unsecure, shifting some resources to another 
sector or location reduces the firm’s overall exposure. Such a strategy is commercially sound 
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because it promotes resilience to severe market fluctuations and other economic shocks in a 
way that specialization does not.  The chaotic nature of investment arbitration may indirectly 
spur innovative business activities that would have otherwise gone unexplored.  The precarious 
legal environment in which foreign investors operate can nurture the classic ‘creative 
destruction’ upon which much economic growth relies.99 The capacity of international 
investment law to adapt to changes in the global economic environment through adjustments 
to individual IIAs and context specific interpretations in arbitrations is a consequence of its de-
centralized, self-organizing nature through which it evolves organically through incremental 
changes on a dispute-by-dispute, treaty-by-treaty basis.100 This must be contrasted with the 
situation that existed before the era of notionally rules-based investor-state arbitration, when 
powerful home states were willing to use force in order to protect the economic interests of 
their nationals abroad – an even more desultory system of enforcement that entailed the 
potential of physical harm as well as considerable expense. 
 Finally, there is a risk that lack of faith in a reliable global legal infrastructure may lead 
to internally-focused economic strategies by multinational firms and host states, ultimately 
hindering levels of FDI.  Xenophobic decision-making may in turn divert capital away from 
speculative international projects to those that do not bear the risk of intervention by host states 
or arbitration claims by foreign firms.  This is advantageous because the competitive advantage 
of 21st century firms and states depends more on harnessing technology and research and 
development than it does on expansion through the building of larger factories or digging of 
deeper mines in order to achieve efficiencies of scale.  In other words, the risks associated with 
engaging in FDI in an environment of legal uncertainty may end up encouraging investment in 
the factors which are most conducive to long term prosperity. Such human capital is often more 
readily cultivated through domestic support and investment rather than absorbed through 
international influences.101 This is not to say that innovation-focused strategies are without 
legal-risk, but that this type of investment engages legal risk at the national level (domestic 
intellectual property law and contract law for example) that is more knowable than that which 
is tied to the uneven interpretation of IIAs by arbitration tribunals.  
 
iii) Sovereign Debt Relief, Monetary Relations and International Development 
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The disordered laws upon which the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are 
based as well as their irregular effects on monetary relations and international development 
respectively also engender various benefits.  Both institutions will be considered together in 
this section.   
First with respect to the IMF, sovereign assistance in the form of the notorious ‘bailouts’ 
has led to the problem of moral hazard. Excessive dependence on help from international 
institutions like the IMF has prevented governments from addressing systemic weaknesses in 
their own economies.  It is hard to escape the conclusion that were the IMF’s lending policies 
clearer and the effects of its conditionality arrangements more universally positive, then the 
problem of moral hazard among borrowing states would be magnified.  The political damage 
inflicted as a consequence of reliance on IMF assistance, including its strict conditionality 
measures, suggests that countries are not drawn to the IMF out of economic recklessness. It is 
precisely because IMF assistance is so chaotic that it remains a last choice for countries, 
prompting them instead to focus on fiscal responsibility. 
The failure of the IMF to resolve competitive currency devaluation to benefit domestic 
manufacturers may not be as damaging to the global economy as is widely believed.  The ability 
of countries to manipulate their currency without fear of meaningful reprisal by a centralized 
authority has arguably stimulated the development of wealth-generating global supply chains.  
This is a key component of globalization because international supply chains allow companies 
to source their inputs from countries where their home currency has more value. Firms are able 
to reduce their costs in this way during periods of strong currency. Indeed, the structure of 
global supply chains has shifted monumentally in recent years, meaning that a strong currency 
has less impact on exports now than in the past.102 UNCTAD recently urged that the 
establishment of global supply chains is more important for developing countries than signing 
trade agreements.103 Recent studies have shown that the prices of higher quality goods tend not 
to change in response to currency exchange rate fluctuations – obviating the need for 
competitive devaluation. This finding has significant implications for firms engaged in high 
technology manufacturing as well as in services, which are increasingly dominant components 
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of the economy in many developed and emerging economies.104 A strong currency also allows 
sectors that rely more directly on consumer spending, like travel and food producers, to 
succeed, diversifying the economy away from manufacturing, even if manufacturers in other 
countries enjoy an artificial advantage.  In other words, countries will be wary of devaluating 
their currencies because of the damage that it can inflict on their own economies, even in the 
absence of legal sanction.  
The IMF’s inconsistent policy approach (e.g. variously in favour and against capital 
controls) and their apparent lack of resolve with respect to continued sovereign debt relief 
programs (e.g. against then supportive of lending more money to the Ukraine) while potentially 
prudent in as much as these vacillations represent situation-specific strategies, has also 
justifiably left nation states sceptical about the value of following IMF advice without due 
regard for context. The IMF’s focus on annual growth figures, especially in relation to GDP, 
pays insufficient regard to non-quantifiable issues of public policy which are vital to the proper 
functioning of societies.   China, for example, has moved away from metrics such as GDP and 
the fixation with growth targets in effort to deal with acute social problems such as 
environmental degradation and urban sprawl.105 This may be a case of the IMF perversely 
providing value to its member states by demonstrating what not to do. A better track record of 
success in assisting struggling economies might have made such reactions against IMF policy 
untenable. 
For its part the World Bank may have done little to improve the economies of many of 
the countries in which it has sponsored infrastructure projects, but this does not mean that 
global developmental initiatives have suffered as a consequence. Indeed, the vacuum left by 
the ineffectual World Bank may have created precisely the conditions which have allowed 
other development-focused initiatives to flourish.  Although its economic merits are unproven, 
microfinance lending to small businesses in the developing world has led to positive social 
outcomes in some countries, notably the empowerment of women.106 National export credit 
agencies have been effective in stimulating trade to developing states, also strengthening 
political linkages between donor and beneficiary countries and stimulating knowledge transfer 
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that may have been absent from pure development bank lending.107  Likewise, foreign direct 
investment by private firms has assisted in the development of many countries where 
development bank loans have not worked, also offering spill-overs like employment and as 
well as revenue streams from joint ownership of assets.108  It is arguable that such gains would 
not have been realized had funding been provided on a heavily-bureaucratized World Bank-
sponsored scheme. Rather than crowding-out the field of development, the World Bank’s 
uneven policies appear to have allowed other complementary programs to flourish. 
 Since it appears that the World Bank and the IMF dispense sovereign loans on the basis 
of political allegiance rather than based on strict adherence to their rules, then nations seeking 
these loans will be pressured into forging greater political ties with the United States as well as 
other powerful Western nations that hold sway in these organizations.  From a Western 
perspective then, the IMF and the World Bank have been instrumental in consolidating a global 
community unified under Washington Consensus values such as democracy and laissez faire 
capitalism.  It is not the place to argue the merits or faults of this system or its alternatives here, 
but the fact that a second multilateral institution, the BRICS’s New Development Bank, has 
been created should foster competition between the IMF/World Bank and regional 
development banks.  It should lead to an overall increase in the number of projects that receive 
funding.109 As long as there are alternatives sources of sovereign loans available, possibly 
imposing different types of conditionality arrangements than those of the IMF/World Bank, 
then the decision to adhere to the Western system must not be viewed as coerced, but rather a 
choice based upon ranking of optimal alternatives. Again, the unsettled legal framework and 
disorganization of the IMF and the World Bank have allowed a healthier, competitive 
marketplace for loans that may be filled variously by the BRICS bank, other regional 
development banks and private financial institutions. 
Finally, it must be recognized that regardless of their failure to achieve economic 
growth and irrespective of the ambiguity of many of their foundational legal principles, each 
of the WTO, IMF and World Bank have made a valuable contribution to global information 
collection and dissemination. The surveillance and advising functions of the chief institutions 
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of global economic governance are often overlooked in light of their more high-profile and 
formalized rules-based governance. The accumulation and distribution of economic data on 
trade, FDI, GDP as well as general demographic and economic data contributes to a ‘global 
good’ of greater knowledge and transparency.110 By centralizing information collection, 
governments, firms and citizens are able to respond to a critical collective action problem.  
Whether or not this information is put to productive use in terms of profit generation or 
economic growth is another question, but clearly the elimination of this critical transaction cost 
cannot be discounted, particularly in the case of small governments and SMEs. Access to 
information is one of the great facilitators of the global economy, allowing poorly resourced 
agents to participate more fully in global economic activity.  Flawed though they may be, the 
IMF and World Bank should be celebrated for their role in divesting authority over monetary 
relations and development respectively from the hands of nation states, which are inescapably 
subject to the vagaries of a given government’s current policy needs, and into the comparatively 
steadfast supervision of internationally-constituted goal-oriented bureaucracies. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This article has proposed that the indeterminate rules and questionable long term effects 
associated with the main institutions of international economic governance may be explained 
by the framework of chaos theory. International economic law demonstrates stronger chaotic 
tendencies than is typical of legal orders and, while it exhibits a degree of consistency on the 
micro level, at the macro level it leads to inescapably unpredictable results.  In other words, 
while it might be plausible to anticipate who wins or loses in a given dispute, or whether a 
certain institutional intervention will help a particular country, we can never know how 
international economic law will influence global economic trends.   
There are unquestionably problems associated with the chaotic legal systems that 
underpin international trade, investment, monetary and development, notably difficulties in 
predicting the law’s impact over time, and clearly some degree of certainty in any legal order 
is needed.  However, where the indeterminate and partially ineffectual laws of the WTO, IIAs, 
IMF and World Bank have frustrated the fulfilment of these organization’s stated mandates, 
they have succeeded in permitting geopolitical and market forces to wield their own dynamic 
pressures allowing firms and governments achieve other, often unexpected gains.  In one sense 
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these results may be viewed as a contingent or serendipitous result of the lack of imposition of 
order by international economic law. In another, observed advantages have arisen as an 
affirmative consequence of the chaotic forces present in this regime.  Whether by accident or 
design, international economic law is well-suited to the conditions of uncertainty under which 
governments and firms operate in the international arena. Although the chaotic nature of the 
laws promulgated variously by the WTO, IIAs, the IMF and the World Bank may in one sense 
frustrate their overt purpose of regulating the economic interrelatedness of states, the ensuing 
randomness allows other elements critical to the vitality of the global economy to flourish, 
including fortifying diplomatic relations, liberating resources to devote to human capital and 
spurring innovative market adaptations.   
If the proposition of international economic law as a chaotic system envisioned by the 
physical sciences can be accepted, then chaos theory may further be thought of as a plausible 
unifying explanatory model by which the four chief disciplines within international economic 
law can be understood.  At the risk of over-extending another, unrelated scientific concept, 
chaos may therefore come close to international economic law’s ‘grand unified theory’ linking 
the discipline’s sub fields of trade, investment, money and development in elegant 
coherence.111 Somewhat less expansively, three ancillary conclusions may be drawn from this 
article.  First, scholars of international economic law should question the assumption that near 
approximations of certainty and predictability are necessary conditions for the legitimacy or 
functionality of a legal system.  The decisive absence of these features can and do foster useful 
flexibility and adaptability.  Second, the political dimension of the global economy cannot be 
extricated from any study of international economic law or its effects, nor can the importance 
of natural endowments to economic growth be underestimated.  Legal institutions should 
accordingly be assessed on their capacity to provide just outcomes in each circumstance rather 
than by reference to long term economic benchmarks. Finally and most generally, there is much 
to be gained by applying the analytical framework found in unconventional sources of 
knowledge, such as theoretical constructs of the physical sciences, when exploring social 
systems such as that of international economic law.  It is hoped that this article may offer a 
glimpse into the potential for further fruitful studies of this nature. 
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